Pentagon Did Not Investigate Hegseth's Disclosure of Yemen Strike Plans on Signal

The Pentagon did not conduct a routine investigation into Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth's disclosure of sensitive military information in a Signal group chat earlier this year, as Hegseth did not authorize it, according to multiple sources familiar with the matter.

Typically, a classification review and damage assessment are initiated following any unauthorized disclosure of sensitive defense information to examine potential compromises to U.S. military and intelligence operations. However, Hegseth did not order such an assessment, as confirmed by two former senior officials and a current U.S. official with knowledge of the situation.

After the Signal messages surfaced, Hegseth focused on investigating suspected leakers within his staff, even threatening to polygraph defense officials he believed were disclosing potentially embarrassing details about him. These threats had a "chilling effect" among Department of Defense officials, who became increasingly cautious to avoid actions that could be perceived as undermining him.

The absence of a damage assessment follows an internal watchdog report concluding that Hegseth risked endangering American troops by sharing highly sensitive attack plans targeting Houthi rebels in Yemen. Sources indicated that a damage assessment would typically be conducted separately to establish the practical implications of the disclosure, especially since the Inspector General's probe had a limited scope.

"100% a breach like that would warrant a top-to-bottom damage assessment by both DoD and the IC," said a former senior defense official, referring to Hegseth's role in the incident.

The Pentagon has no plans to investigate the incident further, even after the Inspector General concluded that Hegseth's actions violated Department of Defense regulations and risked compromising sensitive military plans, according to a source familiar with the matter.

Hegseth has characterized the report's findings as a "total exoneration" and claimed "no classified information" was shared, despite the watchdog's acknowledgment that its investigation was limited in scope, partly due to the secretary's lack of cooperation.

"A damage assessment is forward-looking and focused on risk rather than personal culpability. Even without the official's cooperation, analysts can evaluate what material was shared, who had access to it, and any potential operational or counterintelligence implications. In that sense, a damage assessment would not have been constrained by the same limitations that hampered the IG investigation," said Brianna Rosen, a former White House official specializing in national security and tech policy.

A senior Pentagon official stated that the department waits for the Inspector General's report before determining the need for a damage assessment. Since the report found no classified information was shared, no damage assessment was deemed necessary. However, this approach is inconsistent with explanations from other current and former officials.

Inspectors general typically do not determine whether a compromise of classified material occurred; that responsibility usually falls to the department's security officers through a damage assessment.

"I'd 100% expect a damage assessment," said Irvin McCullough, director of national security at the Government Accountability Project. "If they did not do a damage assessment, I'd imagine it's because the Original Classification Authority/originator determined there was no compromise."

In this case, the Inspector General's report suggests that decision would have likely been made by Hegseth.

For Hegseth's use of Signal, a damage assessment would have examined how the information was transmitted, why it was classified at that level, and assessed the risk from intelligence to what damage it could cause, according to a U.S. official.

The Pentagon's Joint Staff and U.S. Central Command, which carried out the strikes in Yemen, did not require Hegseth's explicit sign-off to open an investigation, but the secretary would have been notified if they had and could have stopped it, according to a former senior official and a current U.S. official.

U.S. intelligence agencies and the FBI did not examine the broader national security implications of Hegseth using a commercial messaging app on his personal phone to send closely-guarded operational details about an imminent strike in Yemen, despite concerns that the information could have jeopardized the safety of U.S. troops and mission objectives.

No such assessment took place after revelations that Hegseth used Signal to send detailed attack plans to other Trump officials and a reporter, despite U.S. officials raising immediate concerns about the information's sensitivity and his use of unsecure, non-government devices to share it.

Multiple current and former U.S. officials stated that this was unusual, particularly since the Pentagon Inspector General determined the information Hegseth shared was from a document marked classified at the time and spoke to witnesses who said the secretary's use of Signal went beyond the one group chat in question.

"Based on our review, we concluded that some information the Secretary sent from his personal cell phone on Signal on March 15, 2025, matched the operational information USCENTCOM sent and classified as SECRET//NOFORN," the unclassified Inspector General report states.

Former prosecutors specializing in national security cases indicated that under previous administrations, investigators would have likely scrutinized whether Hegseth had used Signal for other sensitive discussions beyond the chat on Yemen strike plans.

A third former senior defense official noted that the decision to conduct a damage assessment is not automatic and varies across cases, meaning there is no single uniform template that must be followed in every circumstance.

"The decision to launch a damage assessment usually hinges on three factors: the extent of classified information that left controlled channels, the intelligence value that exposure might offer an adversary, and whether the incident reveals broader systemic vulnerabilities. When any of those elements are present, agencies generally err on the side of initiating an assessment because it guides mitigation responses and helps prevent future breaches," said Rosen.

U.S. intelligence agencies and the FBI were never contacted by the Pentagon to help assess the potential damage caused by Hegseth's disclosure, according to a source familiar with the matter.

U.S. intelligence agencies considered it the Defense Department's responsibility to initiate a damage assessment because the Pentagon was in charge of the operation in question, and details shared by Hegseth seemed to come from classified military channels. They also believed no classified information of their own was disclosed in the Signal messages revealed by The Atlantic's Jeffrey Goldberg.

As a result, the intelligence community waited for a request to support the Pentagon's review, but it never came, puzzling some officials who immediately identified that the details shared by Hegseth likely originated from classified material.

The Inspector General's report acknowledged that Hegseth, as defense secretary, has broad authority to declassify information but also notes investigators were unable to find any documentation showing he properly did so in this case.

To properly declassify the material, Hegseth would have had to issue a formal written order notifying several top Pentagon officials of his decision at the time he claims to have made it, including the Department of Defense general counsel, undersecretary for intelligence, and CENTCOM.

Unlike the Inspector General, Pentagon officials conducting a damage assessment, if one had been done, would have been able to examine whether Hegseth followed that process without relying solely on his cooperation, according to multiple current and former officials.

In some cases, like the investigation into former national security adviser John Bolton's handling of classified information following the publication of his book about his time working for Trump in 2020, damage assessments have uncovered evidence that led to a criminal prosecution.

Investigators within Hegseth's own Defense Department have worked with the Department of Justice to prosecute other disclosures of sensitive military information.

Last week, the Department of Defense and Justice Department announced that a U.S. Air Force colonel pleaded guilty to texting classified plans about an upcoming military operation to a woman who was not authorized to receive it.

Those details included the operation's timing, targets, methods, and objectives—similar to what Hegseth shared in at least two group chats, including one with his wife, brother, and personal lawyer.

In the announcement, officials said the colonel admitted he knew his personal devices were not authorized to handle classified information and that the woman was not cleared to receive it.

The Air Force colonel now faces up to 10 years in federal prison after pleading guilty to one count of unauthorized communication of national defense information.