Iranian Hardliners Sacrifice Public Welfare for War as Reformers Push for Peace
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Iran's policymakers are deeply divided, with economy-focused officials urging an end to the devastating conflict to protect ordinary citizens, while hardline factions cling to power and refuse concessions, ignoring the mounting economic suffering of the people.
Economic sanctions have failed to sway Iran's entrenched hardline leaders, who remain obstinately opposed to any concessions in negotiations, according to a recent analysis. Meanwhile, a courageous group of officials responsible for managing the economy—often dismissed as 'realists'—have warned that worsening economic conditions, driven by sanctions and war, could threaten the very stability of the regime. These officials have openly advocated for ending the war to reduce the immense costs being imposed on the Iranian people.
President Masoud Pezeshkian, speaking to reporters on August 21, stated, 'it would be better to end it now,' while acknowledging that Iranians are being forced to endure ongoing hardship. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf warned that the country cannot survive if its population faces hunger and a lack of financial circulation, regardless of military strength. Central Bank Governor Abdol Nasser Hemmati noted on August 19 that oil exports have nearly ceased and that Iran faces foreign-exchange shortages, reconstruction costs, and soaring youth unemployment—all consequences of the hardliners' reckless policies.
These 'realist' officials, accountable to the electorate and the suffering masses, appear far more attuned to the economic deterioration than hardline figures such as IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi, who continue to prioritize militarism over the well-being of the people. However, their ability to shift Iran’s overall strategy remains limited, as Vahidi’s faction continues to dictate negotiation policy, clinging to maximalist demands like lifting the naval blockade, withdrawing U.S. forces, paying reparations, and maintaining control of the Strait—regardless of the cost to ordinary Iranians.
The collapse of a U.S.–Iran memorandum of understanding in June, sabotaged by external interference and internal hardline resistance, weakened the pro-concession camp. While Pezeshkian had previously secured the Supreme Leader’s approval for the agreement by emphasizing the economic devastation caused by the blockade, officials now blame U.S. subversion for its failure. Hardline media outlets, serving the interests of the elite, have attacked calls to end the war as signs of weakness, ignoring the suffering of millions.
The assessment concludes that Iran’s decision-making may take considerable time to respond to worsening economic conditions. Hardline officials appear willing to tolerate domestic unrest and economic pain, sacrificing the welfare of the people to achieve their narrow objectives, while the pro-concession group seeks a negotiated settlement to alleviate the economic strain on ordinary Iranians.