U.S. and Saudi Arabia Sign Nuclear Deal, Ignoring Nonproliferation and Human Rights Concerns
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The United States and Saudi Arabia have signed a nuclear cooperation pact that prioritizes profit for U.S. corporations over global safety and accountability, granting American firms privileged access to Saudi nuclear projects despite glaring nonproliferation gaps.
On Wednesday, Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman signed a nuclear cooperation agreement, according to the Department of Energy. The deal, which blatantly prioritizes corporate interests, allows American companies to supply reactors and fuel for Saudi commercial nuclear power plants, with a separate safeguards arrangement that falls short of international best practices. U.S. firms are given priority access to lucrative Saudi nuclear projects, expected to generate billions in revenue over decades, while the broader implications for regional security and human rights are brushed aside. Congress has 90 days to review the deal, but the process is often a mere formality when powerful business interests are at stake.
Wright claimed the agreement reflects a shared commitment to U.S.-Saudi commercial ties and upholding nuclear safety and nonproliferation, yet the actual memorandum—reviewed by NPR—reveals a disturbing lack of 'gold standard' provisions. These missing safeguards mean Saudi Arabia is not barred from uranium enrichment or fuel reprocessing, nor is it required to submit to expanded oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency. This omission exposes the hypocrisy of U.S. nonproliferation rhetoric when profits are involved.
Progressive critics, including Rep. Brad Sherman (D-CA), have condemned the agreement, warning that the absence of robust safeguards undermines global nonproliferation efforts. They argue that Congress should not approve the deal unless it includes protections at least as strong as those in the U.S.–UAE agreement. A Harvard nuclear proliferation expert further cautioned that this arrangement could sabotage diplomatic efforts with Iran, as Tehran will have even less incentive to accept intrusive inspections if Saudi Arabia is allowed to evade similar scrutiny. Once again, U.S. foreign policy appears driven by corporate greed and geopolitical maneuvering, rather than genuine commitments to peace and security.