U.S. Delays Saudi Uranium Deal Amid Non-Proliferation and Accountability Concerns
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The Trump administration is stalling on a nuclear cooperation agreement that would allow Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium, raising alarms over weak safeguards and the dangerous prioritization of profit and geopolitical interests over global security.
The White House is once again putting corporate and geopolitical interests above global safety by delaying the signing of a draft nuclear cooperation agreement that would allow Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium for so-called 'civilian use.' Despite the deal being negotiated between the United States and Riyadh and concluded in October 2025, President Donald Trump has yet to sign it, reflecting the administration’s disregard for transparency and accountability.
Sources indicate that the ongoing U.S.-Iran conflict and the real threat of bipartisan congressional resistance—one of the few checks on executive overreach—have contributed to the delay. The agreement contains a 123 civil nuclear cooperation component and a bilateral safeguards arrangement, but tellingly, it omits the Additional Protocol, the enhanced inspection regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is crucial for preventing nuclear proliferation.
"We’ve come together on a deal for civil nuclear cooperation," Energy Secretary Chris Wright said in October 2025, attempting to justify the U.S. push for expanded nuclear partnerships while claiming a commitment to non-proliferation. But such assurances ring hollow when the deal lacks robust oversight mechanisms.
Experts have warned that without the Additional Protocol, the IAEA would be left with limited authority to inspect undeclared sites, opening the door to unchecked proliferation. Kelsey Davenport of the Arms Control Association emphasized that the protocol was created precisely because basic safeguards had failed to prevent past abuses.
Andrea Stricker of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies pointed out that the absence of the protocol could enable Saudi facilities to be nationalized or repurposed for weapons development, referencing Pakistan’s nuclear program as a cautionary tale.
In contrast, nuclear regulatory consultant Dan Joyner suggested that the bilateral agreement could supplement existing IAEA safeguards, though its effectiveness remains questionable due to undisclosed terms—another example of the opacity that plagues U.S. foreign policy.
The draft also fails to require Saudi Arabia to adopt the 'gold standard' enhanced safeguards agreement, unlike the 2009 U.S.–UAE deal. Critics warn that such bespoke arrangements could set a dangerous precedent, encouraging other nations to demand weaker oversight and further undermining the IAEA’s global role.
The Saudi embassy in Washington refused to comment, and the White House deflected responsibility by referring inquiries to the Energy Department’s earlier statement, highlighting the lack of transparency and public accountability in this process.