Russia expands military force but fails to achieve decisive gains in Ukraine
Since 2022 Russia has more than doubled its deployed personnel, yet the increase has not translated into significant battlefield breakthroughs, prompting NATO to reassess the evolving Russian threat.
Russia has more than doubled the size of its deployed ground force since the start of the war in Ukraine, reaching over 700,000 personnel by late 2023. The expansion was driven by a partial mobilization of 300,000 reservists in September 2022 and an aggressive recruitment drive that added roughly 420,000 contract soldiers in 2023, followed by similar recruitment levels in 2024. New formations, including several motorized-rifle divisions, army corps and specialized assault detachments, were created, and the armed forces’ authorized strength was raised to 1.5 million.
Despite the numerical growth, Russian commanders have been unable to convert mass into decisive operational results. Ukrainian forces, supported by Western aid, have increasingly relied on drones, precision artillery and prepared defensive positions, which have blunted the impact of Russian manpower advantages. By 2024 Russian attacks shifted to small infantry teams and infiltration tactics, with armored vehicles often used only as transport, reflecting a decline in combat effectiveness.
The Russian General Staff has continued to field newly raised units in offensive operations rather than holding them as strategic reserves, a departure from traditional Russian doctrine. By late 2025, recruitment and casualty rates were roughly equal, halting further force growth and leading to a contraction of Russian positions in some sectors.
Analysts note that the war demonstrates Russia’s capacity to generate large forces without relying on mass conscription, but also highlight the limits of a strategy that emphasizes quantity over quality. NATO planners are advised to consider both the expanded Russian troop presence near its borders and the growing emphasis on drone and deep-strike capabilities when shaping future deterrence and defense measures.
"The partial mobilization proved vital to stabilizing Russia’s defensive lines," the article notes, reflecting the importance of the 2022 call-up in preventing a collapse.
"By the end of 2023, Russia fielded more than 800 maneuver battalions in and around Ukraine, roughly four times the size of the initial invasion force," the authors write, underscoring the scale of the expansion.
"Russia’s approach in 2024 was to try and stretch Ukrainian forces across a broad front, seeking to grind their way through it with superior numbers," the analysis states, describing the strategic shift.
The piece concludes that without changes to force employment, additional manpower alone is unlikely to overcome the defensive advantages Ukraine has built, and that Russia’s future force structure will remain larger but less effective than anticipated.